The Unborn Victims of Violence Act: Addressing Moral Intuition and the Right to Choose by Malcolm, W. Derek
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 
Volume 1 
Issue 2 Winter 2005 Article 6 
January 2005 
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act: Addressing Moral Intuition 
and the Right to Choose 
W. Derek Malcolm 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Malcolm, W. Derek (2005) "The Unborn Victims of Violence Act: Addressing Moral Intuition and the Right 
to Choose," Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss2/6 
This Policy Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL 
Journals), published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy by an authorized editor. For more information, 
please visit https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp. 
UNBORN VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE ACT
NOTE
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act:
Addressing Moral Intuition and the Right to Choose
Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).
Amid heated political rhetoric from both sides of the
abortion debate, President Bush signed the Unborn Victims
of Violence Act ("the Act")1 into law on April 1, 2004.2
The Act, also referred to as "Laci and Connor's Law,"
3
makes the killing of a fetus during the commission of
certain Federal crimes a separate offense punishable in
varying degrees. 4 Pro-life campaigners maintain that the
Act is necessary to reduce the ever-increasing numbers of
violent attacks against pregnant women. 5 Pro-choice
advocates, on the other hand, argue that the Act is nothing
more than an attempt to "erode the foundations of the right
to choose as recognized by the Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade."
6
In analyzing the ramifications of the Act, both critics
and advocates are quick to bring abortion into the
discussion. However, given the explicit language of the
statute and its legislative history, appealing to abortion is an
Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.
1841).
See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., Key Facts on the Unborn Victims of
Violence Act, available at
http://www.nrlc.org/UnbornVictims/keypointsuvva.html (last updated
Apr. 1, 2004).
3 In memory of Laci Peterson and her unborn child, Connor, who
disappeared Christmas Eve, 2002. Ms. Peterson and Connor were later
found dead. See H.R. REP. No. 108-420 pt. 1, at 8, reprinted in 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. 533,538.
4 See Unborn Victims of Violence Act, § 2(a).
5 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 4.
6 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 81; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
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unnecessary, unsupported step. It is a misunderstanding of
the Act for either side of the abortion debate to use the
Act's language as a tool to advance any position on
abortion or fetal rights. Despite an express exception to
cases of medically legal abortion7, many continue to attack
the Act because they feel that the Act infringes dangerously
on the constitutionally guaranteed right to choose.
Although an overwhelming majority of Americans
polled expressed support for a fetal crime law,8 abortion
rights groups have propounded four main arguments in
their opposition to the Act.9 First, they argue that the Act's
lack of a mens rea requirement violates principles of due
process. Second, they claim the Act will lead to extensive
litigation concerning the fetus. Third, they argue the Act
does not address the crimes against pregnant women, which
it set out to remedy. Finally, abortion rights groups argue
that the Act is an attack on a woman's right to choose. 10
This note defends the Unborn Victims of Violence Act
in an attempt to reconcile the need for a fetal homicide law
with a woman's constitutionally protected right to choose.
The analysis addresses each of the four above-mentioned
arguments and demonstrates why each is without merit. A
fetal homicide law is not inconsistent with the principles set
forth in Roe v. Wade1 1 concerning a woman's right to
choose.
At common law, the "born alive" rule governed
7 See H.R. RE'. No. 108-420, at 4.
8 Michael Holzapfel, Comment, The Right to Live, The Right to
Choose, and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 431,436 (2002)stating 2001 poll revealed 90
percent of Americans would support a fetal crime law).
9 See H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 81-88.
10 Id.
"' 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
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conviction for the death of an unborn child. 12 This rule was
articulated by Sir Edward Coke, who wrote:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a
potion or otherwise killeth it in her wombe; or if
a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her
body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this
is a great misprision, and no murder; but if the
childe be borne alive and dieth of the potion,
battery, or other cause, this is murder: for in the
law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in
rerum natura, when it is born alive.
13
Thus, under this rule, one who caused the death of an
unborn fetus was punished only if the fetus was born alive
and later died from the injuries sustained while in the
womb. 14 The punishment for this offense was the same as
the punishment for killing another person. 15 The killing of
a quickened fetus before birth, however, was considered
only a "great misprision," or misdemeanor, while the
killing of a fetus before quickening was not a punishable
offense at all.
16
Over time, state legislatures began changing their laws
on fetal homicide in response to what many viewed as
moral deficiencies in current homicide statutes. Perhaps
the most famous instance of this phenomenon was the
California legislature's response to Keeler v. Superior
12 Hilary A. Converse, Note, The Fetal Homicide Fallacy: A
Comparison of California's Inconsistent Statutes to Other States, 25 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 451,453 (2003).
13 Holzapfel, supra note 8, at 443 (quoting E. COKE, THE THIRD PART
OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1628)).
14 Converse, supra note 12, at 453.
15 Id.
16 Alan S. Wasserstrom, Homicide Based on Killing of Unborn Child,
64 A.L.R. 5TH 671, 686 (2004) (stating that quickening was generally
held to occur between the sixth and eighth week of pregnancy).
3
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Court. 17 Keeler became enraged after discovering that his
ex-wife was pregnant by another man. 18 Keeler followed
his ex-wife on a mountain road, blocked her vehicle, and
told her to get out of her car. 19 He told her he knew she
was pregnant, and after looking at her stomach, became
visibly upset. 20 Referring to the unborn child, Keeler said
he was going to "stomp it out of [her]." 21 He then pushed
her against her car, kneed her in the abdomen, and hit her in
the face several times.22
The fetus was delivered stillborn via Caesarian section;
it had severe skull fractures and was devoid of air in the
lungs.23 A doctor testified with reasonable medical
certainty that the fetus had reached the stage of viability.24
Keeler was charged with the murder of the fetus; however,
at that time the California homicide statute required the
"unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought., 25 The court held that, because the California
legislature's definition of murder applied only to those who
were born alive,26 Keeler could not be convicted for the
murder of the fetus. Such a conviction, the court reasoned,
would deny Keeler's due process rights since it would
require a construction of the homicide statute which Keeler
did not anticipate.27
In response to Keeler, the California legislature
amended its homicide statute to include the killing of a








25 Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 187).
26Id. at 622.
27 Id. at 630.
4
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fetus.28 Since Keeler, other states addressed similar cases
of intentional fetal homicide, and many of them responded
with similar statutory amendments.29 Currently, 31 states
have homicide laws that make it a crime to kill a fetus.3 °
Eighteen of these states punish the killing of a fetus at any
prenatal stage of development; however, 12 of these states
recognize the fetus as a victim only after a certain stage of
prenatal development. 31 The prenatal stage at which the
fetus is recognized as a victim varies by state. Of the 19
states that do not have fetal homicide statutes, 13 adhere to
the common law "born alive" rule.32 The remaining six
28 CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2004).
29 See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., A Votefor the Lofgren "One- Victim"
Substitute is a Vote Against Protectionfor Unborn Victims of Violence,
available at
http://www.nrlc.org/UnbornVictims/ShiwonaPaceStandard.pdf
(statemnt by Shiwana Pace discussing how she was attacked by hit-
men hired by her ex-boyfriend to kill her unborn baby. As she was
being beaten, the attackers said to her, "Your baby is dying tonight."
An Arkansas court convicted the ex-boyfiend of murdering the baby
based on a state law enacted just one month earlier).
30 See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., available at
http://www.nrlc.org/UnbornVictims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html
(listing 31 states with laws which recognize the killing of a fetus, at
varying stages of development, as homicide: Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, & Wisconsin).
31 id.
32 See Ala. Code § 13A-6-1(2) (1994); Alaska Stat.§ 11.41.140 (Michie
22000); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-101(2) (32001); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann.§ 53(a)-3(l) (West 2001); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 707-700
(Michie 1999 & Supp. 2001); Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 1-
101(h) (year) Code, art. 27 407 (1996); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tTit. 17-A,
§§ 2(20), 201 (West 1993); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-101(28) (2001);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-14(g), :11-2 (West 1995); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
17 (1999); Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.005(3) (1999); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §
5301(4) (Supp. 1998); W. Va. Code § 61-2-1 (1997).
5
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states follow the "born alive" rule, but still criminalize
actions that cause injury or death to a fetus. 33 This rule has
been referred to as the "born alive with a caveat" rule.
34
States in this category avoid the question of whether a fetus
can be classified as a separate victim by punishing, as a
crime against the mother, the act of injuring or killing her
fetus.
35
Until passage of the Act, federal criminal law followed
the common law "born alive" rule.36 In an effort to keep
federal law on pace with quickly evolving state laws by
following the legal trend of "dismantling the common law
born alive rule,, 37 Representative Melissa Hart38 proposed
the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. The argument for
passing the Act is congruent with the rationale behind the
adoption of similar laws by 31 state legislatures. Moral
intuition seems to suggest that the killing of a fetus, when
done maliciously and without the mother's permission,
should not go unpunished merely because the fetus is not
"born alive.
' 3 9
Five years after it was first introduced, the bill was
signed into law, to recognize fetuses as separate and
distinct victims of crime for the first time under federal
33 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 222(22) (Supp. 19992002); Iowa Code
Ann.§ 707.8 (West Supp. 2000); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-3440,21-3441
(1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 631:1(I)(c), 631:2(I)(e) (1999); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 66-8-101.1 (Michie 1998); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-
502(a)(iv) (Michie 1999).
34 Holzapfel, supra note 8, at 457 (creating a category for states who do
not have fetal homicide laws, but punish the act of killing a fetus as a
crime against the mother).
35 id
36 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 5.
31 Id. at 5-6.
38 Melissa Hart is a Member of Congress representing the 4
th
Congressional District of Pennsylvania. She sponsored the proposed
Unborn Victims of Violence Act in the U.S. House of Representatives.
39 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 8-13.
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law.4° On April 1, 2004, H.R. 1997 became Public Law
108-212.41 Following passage of the Act, the killing or
injuring of a fetus, under certain circumstances, became
punishable as a federal crime. In so doing, Congress also
filled the void in the 19 states that do not have state laws
recognizing a fetus as a potential homicide victim. Feticide
also became a crime in federal jurisdictions-such as the
military-that previously adhered to the "born alive" rule.
42
As mentioned above, the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act aligns federal law with the homicide statutes of 31
states. 43 The law amends the United States Code and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice to make it a federal crime
to cause the injury or death of a fetus during the
commission of any of 68 enumerated federal offenses.44
While the Act filled what many viewed as a moral void,
its passage stirred up issues within the broader abortion
debate. Pro-choice and pro-life advocates agreed that the
Act as a small step towards attacking the legality of
40 Id. at 434. In fact, two Congressional sessions passed before the Act
began to move through the House of Representatives. Id. at 437-38.
41 Nat'l Right to Life Comm., supra note 2, available at
http://www.nrlc.org/UnbomVictims/keypointsuvva.html.
42 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 1 -4.
43 See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., supra note 30.
41 118 Stat. 568 § 1841. Ifa fetus is killed during the commission of
one or more of sixty-eight enumerated Federal crimes, criminal
homicide liability for the death of the fetus may attach to the actor.
Among the more common of those specifically listed sixty-eight crimes
are: drug related drive by shootings, 18 U.S.C.A. § 36; deprivation of
Constitutional rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C.A. § 242; possession
of firearms or dangerous weapons in a Federal facility, 18 U.S.C.A. §
930; murder, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1111; manslaughter, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1112;
attempted murder, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1113; kidnapping, 18 U.S.C.A. §
1201; bank robbery, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113; aggravated sexual abuse, 18
U.S.C.A. § 2241; section 408(e) of the Controlled Substance Act of
1970, 21 U.S.C. 848(e); and section 202 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, 42 U.S.C. 2283.
283
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abortion.45 Ultimately, however, each side is mistaken as
to the legal and moral effects the Act will have on abortion
rights.
In an attempt to protect constitutional rights guaranteed
in both the Fourteenth Amendment46 and under Roe v.
Wade,47 pro-choice supporters presented various arguments
to reveal what they feel are inadequacies and legal flaws
within the Act.48 While both the constitutional and
practical arguments attacking the Act are without merit,
such arguments are nonetheless unnecessary because the
Act suggests nothing about the nature of the fetus that
would make the Act inconsistent with current abortion
rights.
I. Due Process Implications
Opponents of the Act argue that the lack of a mens rea
requirement renders it unconstitutional. 49 Because the Act
requires neither knowledge of a woman's pregnancy nor
intent to cause injury or death to a fetus, opponents argue
that an accused's due process rights are violated because
there is no criminal intent element and no knowledge of
whether one is actually committing a violation of the Act. 50
Supporters of the Act look to the familiar criminal law
doctrine of transferred intent, which, they argue, saves the
constitutionality of the Act by supplying the requisite mens
45 Id.
46 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
4' 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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rea element.5' Under this approach, if one intends to injure
person A, but instead injures person B, the actor can be
punished for the crime against person B even though he had
no intention to harm person B. The intent to injure person
A transfers to person B. Thus, the actor can be punished
for committing a crime against a person who was never an
intended victim.
The theory, as applied to a fetus, is that the intent to
commit one or more of the 68 enumerated federal crimes
upon anyone transfers to the fetus of an expectant mother.
52
Under this transferred intent analysis, the appropriate mens
rea exists to convict a person for injuring or killing a fetus
without a violation of the perpetrator's due process rights.
Opponents argue that transferred intent fails to remedy
the due process issues in the Act because such intent can be
transferred only to another person, thus a fetus would be
given the classification of a distinct victim of homicide.53
But this is precisely what the Act does - it legally
recognizes the fetus as an independent victim of crime. 54
To argue that transferred intent does not apply to the Act
ignores the fact that the Act was to make transferred intent
to apply to a fetus.
Opponents also argue that transferred intent applies
only to a "person;" but classifying a fetus as a "person" is
inconsistent with Roe v. Wade.55 Again, this argument
misses an important linguistic point. If the language of a
homicide statute is properly worded, there is no reason that
transferred intent could not apply to a person and a fetus as
51 id.
2H.R. REP. No. 108-420 (stating that transferred intent was recognized
at common law as early as the 16"e century).
53 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 85 (2004), reprinted in 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. 533,559.108-420.
54 Holzapfel, supra note 8, at 434.
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a separate category. This would prevent the need to force a
"fetus" into the classification of "person." For instance, a
statute could be worded, "Murder is the intentional killing
of another person or fetus with malice aforethought. If one
intends to kill another person with malice aforethought and,
in the commission of that act, kills a fetus, such malicious
intent will transfer from the intended other person to the
fetus."
While this is not how most current homicide statutes
are worded, there is nothing to prevent a future homicide
statute from being so worded. In fact, this is exactly what
the Act did. Given the current shift in fetal homicide laws
from the old common law "born alive" rule towards the
recognition of a fetus as a victim, crafting such a statute
would not only be permissible, it would be logically
consistent with the current jurisprudential shift.
However, invoking the doctrine of transferred intent
may not be necessary. The framework for convicting such
actors already exists under many homicide statutes without
recourse to transferred intent. For example, many homicide
statutes follow some variation of the common law
definition of murder as "the intentional killing of another
with malice aforethought., 56 Thus, if one has "malice
aforethought" and intentionally kills another, he has
committed murder. The language of such statutes does not
require the actor to maliciously intend to kill the person
who is actually killed. This language only requires that the
actor maliciously intend to kill someone, and that someone
be killed during the actus reus of the crime. The person
killed need not be the object of the malicious intent. Thus,
a linguistic analysis of many homicide statutes makes
transferred intent an unnecessary tool.
56 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) (West 1999) stating that "murder
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Furthermore, the lack of mens rea is not necessarily
crucial since criminal law recognizes strict liability
offenses. For example, most states' statutory rape laws
make it a crime to engage in sexual acts with someone
under the age of consent, regardless of whether the
perpetrator actually knows the victim's age.57 The fact that
a person can commit one of the sixty-eight enumerated
offenses within the Act without ever knowing that he or she
is committing a second crime bears great similarity to
conviction under a statutory rape law.
58
For example, a 19-year-old man can be convicted for
having sex with a 14-year-old girl, even though the man
had no intention of committing statutory rape. In fact, even
if the girl told the man that she was 18, he could still be
convicted. Analogously, a man can be convicted for killing
a fetus, even though he had no intention of committing fetal
homicide. If mistake of fact and mistake of law are no
defense to strict liability offenses such as statutory rape,
then why not interpret fetal homicide laws as strict liability
offenses as well. Not only would this negate the need for a
mens rea requirement, but given the harsh punishment that
could attach without any intent to injure the fetus, it would
greatly advance the underlying purpose of the Act - to
prevent violent attacks against women. Most men are
cognizant of statutory rape laws, and the fear of such
prosecutions often provides the basis for refraining from
sex with a partner of questionable age. Many men may
also fear a fetal homicide law, and would thus refrain from
carrying out violent acts against women.
In short, the lack of a mens rea requirement is not fatal
to the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. In fact, from a
criminal law standpoint, it is far less of an issue than the
Act's opponents allege. The argument that the Act is
57 See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506 (West 2000).
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unconstitutional because it violates due process rights is
simply not compelling.
II. Potential for Excessive Litigation
Opponents of the Act also argue that it will open the
door to a flood of litigation concerning the nature and rights
of the fetus.59 One of the main arguments is that the Act
confers upon a fetus legal rights equivalent to those of the
mother, and litigation over those rights could result in fetal
rights surpassing those of the mother. 60 This trumping of
women's rights, they fear, could one day lead to a system
in which legally responsible, mentally intact women are
civilly committed for no other reason than to protect the
rights of a fetus. 61 There is no indication that courts are
ready to deprive women of their Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights in order to protect a fetus.
First, nothing in the Act attempts to confer upon a fetus
rights equal to those of the mother. While the Act may
confer some rights upon a fetus, it does not, nor could it,
confer rights equal to that of the mother without violating
Roe v. Wade. Thus, while the mother's rights may, at some
point, come into conflict with the rights of the fetus, Roe v.
Wade has already mandated that the mother's rights
prevail, and Roe is controlling precedent. 62 The Act does,
591 d. at 86.
60 id.
61 Id. (arguing that "[a] future statute might require a woman to be
prosecuted for any act or 'error' in judgment during her term, for her
consumption of wine or cigarettes, or for her decision to fly during
pregnancy. When expanded to cover fetuses, child custody provisions
may be used as a basis for allowing a biological father awarded custody
of the fetus to control the women's behavior, or in some cases, civilly
commit pregnant women to protect their fetuses.").
62 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
288
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however, confer upon a fetus the right not to be injured or
killed without the mother's consent. 63
Second, many argue that the judiciary could view the
rights of a fetus as so important that they must protect them
under every circumstance. The fact is, however, that if the
justice system should ever reach the point where judges, at
the request of a biological father, civilly commit an
otherwise sane woman in order to protect her fetus, then
our legal system will have far more serious issues than the
legal status of a fetus. If that day should ever arrive, the
Constitution and the freedoms it once granted will be in
desperate need of resurrection. 64
Thus, the argument that fetal rights will one day trump
mothers' rights relies on a misinterpretation of the rights
conferred upon a fetus by the Act. In addition, proponents
of the argument paint an irrational, worst-case scenario
picture of the justice system, which makes the argument
entirely unconvincing. For theoretical purposes, one may
argue that, if a fetus is given any protections, our
Constitutional system of justice will decline to a point
where judges imprison women in violation of due process -
a degeneration to a 16 th Century English royal prerogative
without support in and contrary to established law.
63 See 18 U.S.C. § 1841. (2004).
64 Having said that, opponents point to two cases as examples of this
kind ofjudicial overreaching. In the first, a federal case, a judge
ordered a pregnant woman refusing medical care because of her
religious convictions into custody in an attempt to ensure that the baby
be safely born. In the second, a judge sent a student to prison to
prevent her from obtaining a midterm abortion. See H.R. REP. No.
108-420, pt. 1, at 87, n.27 (2004), reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 533,
560 (citations omitted). While these instances are disturbing, they
should be addressed as violations of the tenets of Roe v. Wade as well
as Due Process. It should also be noted that these instances occurred
prior to the passage of the Act, meaning that these cases were in no way
affected by the new law. If this type of occurrence is a problem, it is
one that pre-dated the Act and, thus, cannot be said to have been a
product of the Act.
289
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However, for practical purposes, this argument is based on
fallacy. It reveals a grossly pessimistic view of American
criminal procedure. Further, it ignores an important point -
that the Act was not created for the purpose of endowing
rights upon a fetus, it was created for the purpose of
protecting pregnant women who want to carry their fetuses
to full term birth. Given that endowing the fetus with rights
is not the purpose of the Act, there is no reason to assume
that, if fetal rights ever conflict with a mother's rights, Roe
will not be followed.
III. Failure to Address Violence Against Women
Opponents of the Act next argue that it does not address
the problem it was intended to cure. 65 The Act was
designed in response to the ever-increasing occurrences of
violence against pregnant women. 66 However, opponents
argue that the Act "[flails to recognize that an injury to a
fetus is first and foremost an injury to the woman."
67
Specifically, they argue that the Act "[flails to address the
vast number of domestic violence acts perpetrated against
women and prosecuted under state statutes., 68 Thus,
according to those opposing a federal fetal homicide law,
the Act altogether fails in its attempt to address or reduce
the problem it was created to remedy.
This argument's primary flaw is its failure to consider
the deterrent effect that the Act will have on potential
perpetrators of crimes against pregnant women. While the
Act does not discuss the problem in its express language, it
does provide a means for reducing the number of crimes
against women. The case of Tracy Marciniak provides an
65 See H.R. REP. No. 108-420, at 87.
66 Id. at 5.
67 Id. at 87.
68 id.
14
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example of the possible deterrent effect the Act may have
on potential offenders.
69
Tracy Marciniak was four days from delivering her son,
Zachariah, when she was brutally attacked by her then-
husband, Glendale Black. 70 Black was fully aware that
Tracy was pregnant and that she wanted to have the child.7'
In a successful attempt to end the pregnancy, Black
punched Tracy twice in the abdomen.72 He refused to call
for paramedics and prevented Tracy from obtaining help
for herself. 73 Eventually, he relented and permitted Tracy
to go to the emergency room, where Zachariah was
delivered stillborn by Caesarian section. 74 Tracy herself
was given only 48 hours to live.75
Despite the loss of her child, Tracy managed to survive
the incident and went on to press charges against Black. 76
At the time, Wisconsin did not have a fetal homicide
statute, so Black could be charged only with assault on his
wife. Ultimately, he was convicted on that charge, but he
was not punished in any way for Zachariah's death,77 even
though his sole purpose was to cause the death of the fetus.
After recovering from her attack, Tracy spoke at a
hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the
House Committee on the Judiciary. In her testimony,
Tracy said, "Before his trial, my attacker said on TV that he
would never have hit me if had thought that he could be
charged with the killing of his child., 78 Black's statement
691 Id. at 9.
70 Id.; Holzapfel, supra note 8, at 431.





76 Id. at 9.
77id.
78 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 534 n.3 (2004).
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reveals that he was more concerned with being punished
for killing his child than with actually killing his child.
While there are cases in which fetuses are killed
unintentionally, 79 the cases in which fetuses are
intentionally killed 80 spark in many a desire to punish such
reprehensible behavior. It is this type of violence against
women - violence that intentionally harms the fetuses and
the mother - that proponents of the Act seek to prevent
through the enforcement of a federal fetal homicide law.
Thus, certain types of violence against women likely
will be reduced with the passage of the Act. As Tracy
Marciniak's attacker confessed, he would not have "hit
[Tracy]" if he thought he could have been punished for the
death of "his child."81 Black did not say that he would not
have killed his child if he knew he could be punished - he
said he would not have hit his wife if he knew he could be
punished. Thus, had the Act been in existence and within
Black's knowledge in 1992, he may well not have attacked
Tracy. This is the deterrent effect that proponents of the
Act are quick to point out.
The success of this deterrent effect seems to rest on the
unfortunate fact that attackers are more worried about being
punished than about killing a fetus that the mother wants to
carry to delivery. Because some attackers fear punishment,
at least some may refrain from committing acts that would
otherwise result in death or serious bodily injury to a
pregnant woman. Inasmuch as this deterrent effect exists,
79 For example, on April 19, 1995, Carrie Lenz, a Drug Enforcement
Agency employee, was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing. The day
before, Carrie and her husband had chosen the name "Michael" for the
child she was carrying. H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 539 (2004). In
this case, it is probable that the death of the fetus was not within the
specific intent of the bomber.
80 For others, see Nat'l Right to Life Comm., supra note 8; H.R. REP.
No. 108-420,pt. 1, at 545.
8 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 534 n.3 (2004).
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the argument that the Act fails to address its goal of
preventing violence against women is without merit.
IV. The Assault on a Woman's Right to Choose
Finally, opponents of the Act argue that it is
inconsistent with Roe v. Wade in that it impinges on a
woman's right to choose.82 In Roe, the Supreme Court held
that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as
persons in the whole sense" and concluded that "person,"
as used in the 1 4 th Amendment, does not include the
"unborn. 83 Opponents argue that state legislatures have
made every effort to "secure the recognition of fetuses as
full legal persons," 84 and that the Act is a further attempt to
confer rights upon the fetus equal to those of the woman. 85
This, they feel, is at direct odds with Roe. 
86
Such opponents also argue that the term "unborn child,"
as used in the Act, "implies that personhood begins prior to
birth or viability, as early as the moment of conception."
87
According to this argument, the use of the term "unborn
child" in the Act is in conflict with both the Constitution
and Roe, in which the Supreme Court held that "the use of
the word 'person' is such that it has application only post-
natally." 88 While opponents of the Act have correctly
interpreted Roe, they have misinterpreted the nature and
metaphysical implications of the Act.
2 Id. at 547.
83 Roe, 410 U.S. at 158, 162.
84 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 555 (2004) (listing two state court
cases where the court held that 1) a human being exists from the
moment of fertilization and implantation, and 2) a viable fetus is,
biologically speaking, a presently existing person and a living human
being). H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 555 n.5 (2004).
85 Id. at 557.
86 d.
87 id.88 Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
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Here, opponents of the Act are essentially making three
distinct arguments in suggesting that the Act conflicts with
Roe. First, they argue that the Act is an attempt to confer
personhood upon fetuses. Second, they argue that the Act
attempts to confer rights upon fetuses equal to the rights of
the mother. Third, they argue that by attempting to confer
personhood on fetuses, the Act is at odds with Roe, which
says that unborn children are not persons for purposes of
the 14 th Amendment. 8 9
As to the first argument, nothing in the Act attempts to
confer personhood upon a fetus. In section (d) of the Act,
"unborn child" is defined as "a child in utero," and "a child
in utero" is further defined as a "member of the species
homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried
in the womb." 9 Thus, for the purpose of the Act, a fetus is
a member of the species "homo sapiens." This does not
imply personhood.
While the philosophical discussion of "personhood" is
far beyond the scope of this analysis, one should note that
personhood implies characteristics beyond mere
classification as a particular species. For example, many
philosophers argue that "personhood" is contingent upon
moral agency. Others argue that personhood is contingent
upon conscious self-awareness as a subject in the objective
world. Both moral agency and subjective self-awareness
are themselves contingent upon rational thought. Thus, for
many philosophers, the ability to think rationally is a
prerequisite for "personhood."
To say that an "unborn child" is a member of the
species homo sapiens merely recognizes that a fetus has a
diploid genome consisting of forty-six chromosomes and is
the reproductive progeny of homo sapien parents. 9' Such
89 Id.
90 Unborn Victims of Violence Act, § 2(d).
91 University of Washington, Chromosomes, available at:
http://www.park.edu/bhoffman/courses/bi23 1/recaps/chromosomes.htm
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nominalization and classification of a fetus in no way
implies the characteristics of personhood. In fact, given the
abovementioned characteristics of "personhood," many
philosophers would argue that even infants and young
toddlers are not "persons." If infants and young toddlers
are not "persons," in the philosophical sense, then certainly
a fetus is not a "person." To say that something has the
capacity for personhood is not to say that it is currently a
person. Thus, to say that the Act confers or attempts to
confer "personhood" upon a fetus is a misunderstanding of
the metaphysics of personhood and a misinterpretation of
the language in the Act.
As to the second argument, the Act does not attempt to
confer rights upon a fetus which are equal to the rights of
the mother. This was discussed earlier in this analysis. To
confer upon a fetus the right not to be killed except at the
election of the mother under medically legal abortion
procedures in no way suggests that such a fetus has rights
equal to or greater than those of the mother. In fact, as
discussed earlier, Roe still controls when the rights of the
fetus conflict with the rights of the mother.92 Thus, the Act
simply makes it a crime to injure or kill a fetus during the
commission of one of the sixty-eight listed offenses, which
only confers upon a fetus a limited right not to be injured or
killed without the mother's consent.
As to the third argument, if the Act does not confer
"personhood" upon a fetus, then it cannot be at odds with
the proposition in Roe, which stated that an "unborn child"
is not a person for purposes of the 1 4 th Amendment. As
discussed two paragraphs above, the Act does not attempt
to confer personhood upon a fetus. Thus, there is nothing
inconsistent in classifying a fetus as a member of the
species homo sapiens while respecting the Supreme Court's
holding that "unborn" children are not persons. The Act
92 See Roe,410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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and Roe are completely consistent on this point.
Finally, an affirmative argument can be made in
defense of the Act. In 1987, Richard Smith appealed his
conviction under Georgia's fetal homicide statute to the
1 1th Circuit. 
93 He argued that the fetal homicide law
conflicted with Roe v. Wade.94 The court rejected this
argument, saying, "The proposition that Smith relies upon
in Roe v. Wade - that an unborn child is not a 'person'
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment - is
simply immaterial in the present context to whether a state
can prohibit the destruction of a fetus." 95 Thus, a fetal
homicide statute can prohibit the destruction of a fetus
without ever addressing issues of personhood or fetal
rights.
The Supreme Court has also upheld a state conviction
under a fetal homicide law in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services.96 This case discussed the
constitutionality of Missouri's fetal homicide law 97 The
law declared that "the life of each human being begins at
conception," that "unborn children have protectable
interests in life, health, and well-being," and that all state
laws "shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on
behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development,
all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other
persons, citizens, and residents of this state," to the extent
permitted by the Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court
rulings. 98 The Court refused to invalidate the law and held
that states are free to enforce such laws as long as they do
93 Smith v. Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386 (11 th Cir. 1987).
94 Id. at 1388.
9' See id. at 1388.
96 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
97 Id.
98 Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 1.205.1(1), (2) (1986).
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not restrict abortion in a manner forbidden by Roe. 99
Thus, the Act does not confer rights upon a fetus that
are equal in any way to those of the mother, nor does it
confer personhood upon a fetus. In fact, the Act does not
go as far as some states' fetal homicide laws that were
upheld by the Supreme Court. Given this, there is no
reason why the Act cannot co-exist with Roe v. Wade. The
Act prohibits the unwanted destruction of a fetus by a third
person without the mother's consent during the commission
of certain federal crimes. Roe protects a mother's right to
medically terminate a fetus with her permission and within
the parameters of the law. Thus, the argument that the Act
is an assault on a woman's right to choose is misguided.
The Unborn Victims of Violence Act offers needed
protection to both fetuses and expectant mothers. Past
cases reveal the shocking trauma suffered by women at the
hands of men seeking to terminate their wanted
pregnancies. While abortion is divisive on a normative
level, most would agree that wrongful acts against a fetus
such as those described above should be punished. In fact,
an overwhelming majority of Americans agree that fetal
homicide laws are needed.'°
These laws, however, should not be mistakenly
interpreted in such a way as to threaten current abortion
rights. The Act is not only consistent with the tenets of Roe
v. Wade, it also unequivocally excludes abortion from its
scope of prosecution by express language.10' Thus, while
99 See Nat'l Right to Life Comm., at
http://www.nrlc.org/Unbom-Victims/statechallenges.html (quoting
Webster v. Reproductive Health Svcs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)).
100 H.R. REP. No. 108-420, pt. 1, at 535 (2004) (quoting a survey in
which 84 percent of Americans polled believe that "prosecutors should
be able to bring a homicide charge on behalf of an unborn child killed
in the womb").
101 Unborn Victims of Violence Act § 2(c) (stating that abortion for
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pro-choice advocates should not feel threatened by the Act,
pro-life advocates should not exaggerate its influence. In
fact, both parties should be content with the purposeful
results of the Act: for pro-lifers, the Act punishes the
unwanted destruction of a fetus; for pro-choice advocates,
the Act further preserves a woman's right to choose
because, if the right to choose includes the right to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy, it should also include
the right to protect and preserve a wanted pregnancy.
In closing, the Act is logically and legally consistert
with all of the propositions set forth in Roe v. Wade. For
that reason, the abortion debate should turn attention away
from the Act itself, and activists' efforts should focus a
unified effort on carrying out the Act's intended purpose -
the prevention of injury and death to people like Tracy and
Zachariah Marciniak.
- W. DEREK MALCOLM
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